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RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE: QUESTIONABLE INEVITABILITY AND 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ARMED CONFLICT
Katherine Bogen ‘15 | Political Science & English Major 
ABSTRACT
Wartime sexual violence is a critical human rights issue that usurps the auton-
omy of its victims as well as their physical and psychological safety. It occurs in 
both ethnic and non-ethnic wars, across geographic regions, against both men 
and women, and regardless of the “official” position of commanders, states, 
and armed groups on the use of rape as tactic of war. This problem is current, 
pervasive, and global in spite of the status of wartime sexual violence perpetra-
tion as a crime against humanity and the capacity of the international criminal 
court to indict offenders. Though some scholars have argued that wartime rape 
is inevitable given a global patriarchal culture and the violent context of war, 
this argument upholds a problematic view of opportunistic sexual violence as 
an inevitable, anticipated side-effect of violent conflict. In order to counteract 
such harmful claims, this research examines two cases in which armed militant 
groups engaged in civil wars have limited the use of rape as a tactic of war. The 
examination of the cases of Sri Lanka and El Salvador may challenge the nar-
rative of wartime rape inevitability and reinforce a framework through which 
perpetrators may be held accountable for sexual and gender-based war crimes. 
Further, this examination engages with the current body of sexual violence lit-
erature exploring not only the use of rape in armed conflict, but also the unique 
cases in which wartime rape is rare.
INTRODUCTION & 
BACKGROUND
Wartime sexual violence is a 
critical human rights issue that 
usurps the autonomy of its vic-
tims as well as their physical and 
psychological safety. It occurs 
in both ethnic and non-ethnic 
wars, across geographic regions, 
against both men and women, 
and regardless of the “official” 
position of commanders, states, 
and armed groups on the use 
of rape as tactic of war. Sexual 
violence, especially rape, is a 
tactic most often used by armed 
groups engaging in other acts 
of violence towards citizens (i.e. 
torture, murder, imprisonment) 
and has been qualified as a war 
crime and crime against human-
ity under international human 
rights law. Distressingly, “UN 
agencies estimate that more than 
60,000 women were raped dur-
ing the civil war in Sierra Leone 
(1991-2002), more than 40,000 in 
Liberia (1989-2003), up to 60,000 
in the former Yugoslavia (1992-
1995), and at least 200,000 in 
the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo since 1998” (UN 2014). 
These statistics do not include the 
widespread use of rape during 
the Rwandan Genocide or the 
conflicts in Syria, Mexico, Sudan, 
and other nations. The above 
statistics demonstrate the preva-
lence of wartime rape as well as 
its tendency to disproportionately 
affect vulnerable populations (i.e. 
women, children, indigenous 
populations, and ethnic mi-
norities) in spite of its status as a 
crime against humanity and the 
theoretical capacity of the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC) 
to indict offenders. Regardless of 
illegality, this problem is current, 
pervasive, and global. Despite ef-
forts by some theorists to present 
wartime rape as an inevitable 
result of conflict, recent litera-
ture has sought to undermine 
the argument of inevitability in 
order to counteract the culture of 
impunity that plagues victimized 
populations. It is the hope of cur-
rent human rights and sexual vio-
lence scholars that deconstruct-
ing the theory of wartime rape 
inevitability will create a culture 
of legal accountability that allows 
perpetrators to be more easily 
prosecuted for this horrendous 
war crime.
 The essential view of 
the ‘critical function’ of sexual 
violence has defined rape as a 
“conscious process of intimida-
tion by which all men keep all 
women in a state of fear” (Brown-
miller 1975). Widespread rape 
has hugely traumatic effects not 
only on direct victims, but on 
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entire populations and ethnic 
groups that have been targeted. 
Such shared trauma, in turn, can 
create adult psychopathologi-
cal conditions, including severe 
depression, anxiety, post-trau-
matic stress disorder, self-harm, 
suicidal ideation and suicidal-
ity, homicidality, and lingering 
intergenerational traumatic 
effects. These effects may prohibit 
populations from reaching their 
full emotional and psychological 
potentials. Individuals and popu-
lations that have suffered such 
severe trauma as sexual violence 
may struggle to form healthy 
relationships, gain and maintain 
employment, cultivate healthy 
eating and sleeping habits, and 
create cohesion within families 
(van der Kolk 1987).  As such, 
the widespread occurrence of 
wartime rape affects the mental, 
social, and behavioral health of 
entire populations. Addressing 
the issue of wartime rape may 
allow researchers, healthcare 
providers, international human 
rights organizations, legislators, 
and community leaders to assess 
risk factors for trauma includ-
ing a history of sexual violence 
victimization, address the mental 
and emotional healthcare needs 
of victimized populations, and 
establish trauma-informed care 
practices that may help reduce 
the community-wide psycho-
pathological effects of wartime 
rape (Yehuda et al., 2001).
Recent literature has argued that 
wartime rape is inevitable given a 
global patriarchal culture and the 
violent context of war, even em-
phasizing the seemingly “timeless 
ubiquity” of the phenomenon. 
Research has traced wartime rape 
back to accounts in the Torah, 
works of Homer, and mythologi-
cal examples including the rape 
of the Sabine woman (Gottschall 
2004; Barstow 2000; Sajor 1997). 
Researchers have used femi-
nist theory, cultural pathology 
theory, and strategic rape theory 
to explain that male biological 
urges, problematic socialization 
of men and hypermasculinity 
norms, national trauma history, 
and the ability to use rape to 
achieve wartime goals have all led 
to the supposed inevitability of 
wartime rape. The logical conclu-
sion of these theories is therefore 
that, “we can only stop men from 
raping when we change human 
nature,” rewrite national histories, 
or remove any strategic advantage 
that rape may give to compet-
ing sides in a conflict (Gottschall 
2004, 135).
 However, the claim of 
wartime rape’s “timeless ubiquity” 
is false, dangerous, and may be 
used to effectively excuse per-
petrators of these crimes against 
humanity as simple players in a 
predetermined game of sexual 
warfare. It is the wartime equiva-
lent of “boys will be boys” and 
is based on a masculinist under-
standing of conflict that places 
men solely in the role of perpe-
trator whilst assuming that men 
will rape women given the op-
portunity. This argument claims 
that the natural state of man is 
rapist, and upholds a problematic 
view of opportunistic sexual vio-
lence as an inevitable, anticipated 
side-effect of violent conflict1. In 
order to counteract this harm-
ful claim, a number of human 
rights and international relations 
scholars have begun to examine 
the cases in which armed militant 
groups engaged in civil wars have 
not used rape as a tactic of war. 
The function of this research is 
to assert that, “if some groups do 
not engage in sexual violence, 
then rape is not inevitable in 
war as is sometimes claimed, 
and there are stronger grounds 
for holding responsible those 
groups that do engage in sexual 
violence” (Wood 2009, 132). This 
assertion challenges the “timeless 
ubiquity” argument, deconstructs 
preexisting theories on factors 
that contribute to wartime rape 
(feminist theory, cultural pathol-
ogy theory, and strategic rape 
theory), and creates a framework 
through which perpetrators of 
rape as a weapon of war may be 
held accountable. Finally, such 
research sets a precedent for the 
exploration of not only the use 
of rape in armed conflict, but, as 
important, the unique cases in 
which wartime rape is rare2.
DEFINITIONS
For the sake of reader clarity and 
to provide necessary vocabulary, 
below is a list of defined key-terms 
that will appear throughout 
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1 Additionally, the argument wholly discounts sexual minorities (in this case, gay men), transgender or gender fluid individuals 
who identify as gay, and women who may perpetrate sexual violence.
2 Note of Author Intent: Though this paper will discuss the rarity of wartime rape perpetrated by some armed militant groups, 
the author does not intend to minimize or erase the experiences of people who were victimized by these groups. There are surely 
victims of rape perpetrated by members of militant groups that, as a whole, did not engage in widespread, systematic, or strate-
gic rape. Though instances of rape perpetration by these groups may have been isolated, it is critical that the severity of physical, 
psychological, and emotional impact on the victims not be underestimated.
this research paper.
Cadre – A group of officers 
qualified to form, train, and 
lead a military organization or a 
member of said organization. For 
the purpose of this paper, cadre 
will refer primarily to soldiers in 
resistance movements.
Farabundo Martí National Libera-
tion Front (FMLN) – A Marxist-
Leninist guerilla coalition that 
participated in the Salvadoran 
Civil War (1980-1992) against 
the government of El Savlador. 
Currently, the FMLN exists as a 
political party in El Salvador and 
even won the presidency in 2009 
(Álvarez 2010).
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) – A guerilla organization 
that sought to establish an inde-
pendent Tamil state in northern 
and eastern Sri Lanka. The LTTE 
engaged militarily with the Sri 
Lankan government forces in a 
civil war lasting over 60 years.
Post-Positivism in International 
Relations – Post-positive theory 
includes analyses of international 
relations which move beyond 
examination of state/government 
structure and incorporates class, 
gender, postcolonial social struc-
tures, race, ethnicity, ethics, mor-
als, and other socio-psychological 
influences into the examination 
of international relations and 
resulting political phenomena.
Rape – Penetration, no matter 
how slight, of the vagina or anus 
with any body part or object, or 
oral penetration by a sex organ of 
another person, without the con-
sent of the victim (FBI Uniform 
Crime Reporting Definition, 
2014).
Sexual Mutilation – Any type of 
cutting or removal of all or some 
of the genital organs. Though 
typically used to refer to female 
genital mutilation (FGM), sexual 
mutilation also includes forced 
male circumcision and purpose-
ful injury to the genitalia.
Sexual Torture – Sexual contact 
with a victim designed to instill 
psychological terror. Some ex-
amples of sexual torture include 
forced nudity, rape, sodomy, ver-
bal sexual threats (such as threats 
to impregnate a victim or trans-
mit HIV to a victim), mocking of 
a victim during sexual contact, 
humiliation, or telling a victim 
that (s)he will never normally 
sexually function again. Sexual 
torture is primarily a combina-
tion of sexual and verbal abuse 
meant to psychologically damage 
the victim.
Sexual Violence – Sexual violence 
is any sexual act or attempt to 
obtain a sexual act by violence or 
coercion, unwanted sexual com-
ments or advances, acts to traffic 
a person or acts directed against 
a person’s sexuality, regardless 
of the relationship to the victim. 
(Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention Definition, 2015).
PURPOSE STATEMENT, 
RESEARCH QUESTION & 
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
The purpose of this research 
paper is to explore the cases of 
the civil wars in Sri Lanka and 
El Salvador to determine what 
factors inhibit the use of rape 
as a war tactic, especially when 
wartime rape is asymmetrical – 
that is, when rape is perpetrated 
by one side of the conflict but 
not the other. It is critical that 
researchers examining the use of 
rape and sexual violence in the 
context of war understand that 
sexual and gender-based violence 
do not occur in a vacuum. Socio-
cultural factors have significant 
impact on the use of rape as a 
weapon of war, and may also be 
invoked to restrict this violation 
of human rights. The research 
questions to be examined here 
are: Why is rape perpetrated by 
some actors but not others in the 
same conflict? Additionally, what 
factors may limit or eliminate 
the use of rape as a tactic of war 
within violent inter- and intrastate 
conflict? This paper will argue 
that state actors are more likely to 
use rape as a weapon of war than 
non-state actors, especially when 
non-state actors rely on a positive 
(“good guy”)3 image to recruit 
new members. Further, rape is 
used by many groups as a bond-
ing activity to create unity within 
an armed force that lacks social 
cohesion rather than solely to 
intimidate or punish the victim 
population. Finally, wartime rape 
is not inevitable, as proven by the 
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3 The term “good guy” to refer to the need of guerilla groups to portray themselves in a positive light was coined by Nancy Huston. 
Though this term is inherently gendered, it has been used in political science and international relations scholarship to demon-
strate that, “the plot [of a war story] includes the ‘good guy’ or ‘just warrior’ fighting against the ‘bad guys’ for valorous reasons….
and winning the good fight” and does not seek to determine the actual gender identity of the soldiers (Sjoberg 2006, 35).
asymmetry of use between cer-
tain state and non-state actors.
Within the Sri Lankan case, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), a Tamil secessionist 
group, used sexual violence very 
rarely. Conversely, the Sri Lankan 
state, though it did not officially 
condone the use of rape as a war 
crime, allowed state security 
personnel to engage in, “numer-
ous acts of sexual violence against 
women, men, and children in 
official and secret detention cent-
ers seeking to coerce confessions, 
degrade them, and discourage 
broader Tamil involvement with 
the LTTE” (Human Rights Watch 
2013, 1). This demonstrates 
a critical divergence between 
tactics used to intimidate po-
litical and social opposition and 
to coerce the population. Such 
behavior reduces credibility of 
assertions that parties engaged in 
violent conflict will escalate their 
brutality to parallel or match the 
behaviors of their opponents and 
challenges the expectation that 
competing groups will share the 
same repertoire of violence.
 Similarly, during El 
Salvador’s Civil War “some armed 
groups, such as the Salvadoran 
insurgency, appear to have 
successfully prohibited their 
combatants from engaging in 
sexual violence against civilians,” 
despite the Salvadoran state using 
rape as a method of torture and 
intimidation against both male 
and female detainees (Bergsmo 
et al. 2012, 389). It is necessary 
to examine the different coercive 
and violent tactics used by the 
Salvadoran insurgency (FMLN) 
and the Salvadoran state to influ-
ence civilian opinion. Again, the 
asymmetrical use of rape as a war 
tactic in this civil conflict negates 
the belief that armed groups will 
“add a particular form of violence 
to its repertoire in response to 
another group’s engaging in that 
form, that is, it may ‘mirror’ the 
other’s repertoire” (Wood 2009, 
136). In order to understand 
why wartime rape occurs and 
how to effectively prevent such 
human rights abuses, it is crucial 
that these two cases be closely 
researched, especially due to 
the seeming imbalance between 
uses of sexual violence by enemy 
groups. Further, the findings of 
this research may contribute to 
the existing body of literature by 
investigating the implications that 
rape rarity and asymmetry may 
have on human rights law, espe-
cially the critical application of 
UN Security Council Resolution 
1820 in nations suffering violent 
conflict. Moreover, this litera-
ture aims to contest the claim of 
wartime rape inevitability and to 
reinforce the constructive claim 
that even in times of violence and 
sociopolitical upheaval, rape can 
be limited, crimes can be pros-
ecuted, and accountability can be 
upheld.
 The examination of these 
two case studies will be based 
on post-positivist international 
relations theory and will there-
fore examine the effect of cultural 
aspects such as gender norms, 
security, religion, and class on 
the tendency of armed groups in 
these nations to engage in sexual 
violence during wartime. These 
identifiers may provide help-
ful qualifiers in examining why 
certain armed groups utilize rape 
as a war tactic while oppositional 
actors limit or eliminate the use 
of rape. In order to explore each 
case, this research will investigate 
two main variables: recruitment 
needs for each armed group and 
the “good guy” effect as well as 
cultural cohesion, bonding prac-
tices, and punitive measures. The 
paper hypothesizes that:
1. Armed groups with a  higher 
need to recruit members are less 
likely to commit wartime rape in 
order to maintain moral legiti-
macy (aka the “good guy” image), 
which may account for the asym-
metrical use of rape between state 
and non-state actors.
2. Armed groups that rely on 
forced recruitment or that lack 
group cohesion are more likely to
 engage in wartime rape in order 
to create social bonds, enhance 
camaraderie between soldiers, 
and take revenge on and intimi-
date oppositional actors.
 For the purpose of this 
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Actor
Sri Lankan 
State
Security 
Forces
Liberation 
Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam
(LTTE)
Use of Rape
Widespread, 
systemic, and 
strategic – rape 
used as a punitive 
measure to deter 
LTTE involvement
Very restricted use 
of rape, punitive 
culture within 
LTTE
Goals
Suppression 
of LTTE and 
oppositional 
forces
Secession from 
Sri Lanka and 
the formation 
of an independ-
ent Tamil state
Outcome
“Won” the conflict in 2009, have 
spent the past six years detaining, 
torturing, raping, and punishing 
those involved in insurgency and 
secessionist activism (i.e. anyone 
associated with the LTTE)
“Lost” the conflict in 2009 and have 
suffered extreme brutality as a form 
of state punishment for terrorist 
activities between 1976 and 2009. 
Radical members continue to strug-
gle against the Sri Lankan state.
Foster (2006); Human Rights Watch (2013); Sooka (2014); Tambiah (2006); Wood (2010)
paper, people who have suffered 
rape in a conflict setting will be 
referred to as “victims,” despite 
the problematic, gendered, and 
potentially disempowering 
aspects of this vocabulary; it may 
reinforce the assumption  that 
men embody the position of 
perpetrator while women remain 
vulnerable to these attacks and 
embody the position of victim. 
The gender-based victim/per-
petrator dichotomy created by 
such limited vocabulary ignores 
the complexity of these issues 
(women may be perpetrators; 
men and boys may be victims) as 
well as the intricacies of gender 
and war, and places women in 
a systemically submissive posi-
tion. Other researchers within 
this field have chosen to refer to 
ethnic victims of wartime rape 
as “survivors” in order to reassert 
agency for those individuals who 
have suffered such human rights 
abuses and lived to give accounts. 
However, for the purpose of this 
paper, the term “victim” will be 
used, as many victims of rape in 
these subsequent cases did not 
survive after being subjected to 
sexual violence (for more infor-
mation on the appropriate use 
of victim/survivor vocabulary, 
please see Skjelsbaek, 2006).
CASE STUDY A — SRI LANKA
In order to discuss the Sri Lankan 
case, it is critical to examine the 
unique political atmosphere in 
Sri Lanka during the civil war 
and to outline the opposing sides 
to the conflict. 
 This conflict, which 
officially began in 1983 with an 
armed campaign against the Sri 
Lankan state, was between the 
Sri Lankan government and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(also known as the LTTE or Ta-
mil Tigers). The goal of the LTTE 
was to secede from Sri Lanka and 
create an independent state for 
the Tamil minority in the north-
ern and eastern provinces of Sri 
Lanka (South Asia Terrorism 
Portal, 2014). Though the conflict 
was declared by the Sri Lankan 
state to have ended in 2009, 
violence continues between the 
LTTE and state security forces. 
Despite both sides of the conflict 
having been accused of egre-
gious human rights abuses, mass 
murder, and ethnic cleansing, the 
LTTE conspicuously limited the 
use of sexual violence and rape 
during the conflict while the Sri 
Lankan security forces engaged 
in rape and sexual violence “to 
instill terror in the Tamil com-
munity to discourage involve-
ment with the LTTE” (Human 
Rights Watch 2013, 4). This 
absence of sexual violence4 by the 
LTTE marks a critical divergence 
in the repertoire of violence 
used by both sides and begs the 
question of why these two armed 
groups’ tactics differed.
 In order to clarify the 
use of rape and the ideological 
differences between these two 
oppositional actors, this research 
includes a table (left) outlining 
the specific tactics use by both 
groups as well as their political 
goals.
 The first hypothesis 
explored posits that the need to 
maintain a “good guy” image 
deters non-state actors from en-
gaging in rape as a tactic of war. 
This was proven true in the case 
of Sri Lanka. Tamil culture reified 
the concept of self-sacrifice dur-
ing the conflict, as demonstrated 
by its widespread use of suicide 
bombers in the campaign against 
the Sri Lankan state (Rajan 2011).
 This idea of self-sacrifice 
extended to sexual pleasure and 
sexuality during the conflict 
against the Sri Lankan state and 
upheld the belief that cadres 
involved in armed resistance 
sacrificed their claim to sexual 
pleasure in favor of the political 
struggle. This rejection of sexual 
pleasure and gratification during 
the conflict thereby delegitimized 
the use of rape as a war tactic. 
The regulation of sexual rela-
tions between cadres in general 
created an asexual culture within 
the LTTE, with sexual relations 
outside of marriage strongly 
condemned. The internal reli-
gious life of Tamil society had a 
powerful diminutive effect on the 
willingness of the cadre to engage 
in sexual violence and rape, as it 
is “dominated by rhetoric of sac-
rifice, abnegation, commitment, 
discipline, and chastity under a 
rubric of kinship….The group 
originally required its cadre to 
abstain from sex, as well as liquor, 
smoking, and close contact with 
family or other civilians” (Wood 
2009, 149). To rape civilians or 
opposition would delegitimize 
not only the Tamil cause, but 
tenets of Tamil faith. Moreover, 
as the LTTE strove to appear as 
the legitimate alternative to the 
Sri Lankan state; to mimic the 
repertoire of violence and torture 
used by state actors would have 
challenged the LTTE’s attempt at 
representing themselves as mor-
ally superior.
 Just as the use of rape as 
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4 “By ‘absence of sexual violence’, I mean that sexual violence by a group is very rare, but not necessarily completely absent” 
(Bergsmo et al. 2012, 391).
a weapon of war may be used to 
break a social contract and instill 
fear, as was the case during the 
civil war in Sierra Leone when 
pro-government forces targeted 
young virgin girls to psycho-
logically terrorize the population, 
refraining from using rape may 
actually help create social cohe-
sion between military groups and 
the citizenry (Simpson 2013). 
The “good guy” goal of the LTTE 
was not only critical to maintain 
moral legitimacy, but also to es-
tablish a cooperative relationship 
between the civilian population 
and the LTTE. In the case of the 
LTTE,
When an armed group is strongly 
dependent on civilians for logisti-
cal support, such as supplies, 
recruits, and, especially, intelli-
gence…and when leaders antici-
pate relations continuing over 
some sustained time period, they 
are likely not to tolerate sexual 
violence against those civilians 
for fear of eroding their base of 
support.
              (Wood 2009, 141)
In this way, the absence of rape 
was a strategic decision on the 
part of LTTE leadership, which 
valued information and recruit-
ment more highly than intimida-
tion and terror. This is not to say 
that the LTTE was not violent 
toward citizens. In fact, the LTTE 
frequently inflicted severe civil-
ian casualties against non-Tamil 
villages, with a particular violent 
focus on Muslim populations 
(Cohen et al. 2013). However, the 
refusal on the part of the LTTE 
to use rape as one of these tactics 
upheld their religious ideology, 
lent legitimacy to their campaign 
for moral superiority over the Sri 
Lankan state, and allowed them 
to look comparatively modern 
when held against the brutal 
tactics used by the Sri Lankan 
security forces. Additionally, 
recruitment played a large role in 
the decision of the LTTE not to 
use rape during the conflict, and 
demonstrated that the LTTE was 
unwilling “to lose women’s popu-
lar support, its capacity for coer-
cion notwithstanding,” indicating 
a superficial dedication on the 
part of the LTTE to gender equal-
ity and women’s rights (Tambiah 
2005, 252).
 The LTTE’s repudiation 
of wartime rape and its dedica-
tion to the creation of a “good 
guy” image was not only strate-
gic in terms of moral legitimacy 
and citizen recruitment, but also 
international reputation. The 
critical decision of the LTTE 
to eschew rape as a war tactic 
indicated a baseline dedication 
to principles of human rights as 
upheld on an international scale. 
Leaders of the LTTE may “pro-
hibit sexual violence out of defer-
ence to international law…per-
haps because they aspire to some 
sort of international recognition” 
(Bergsmo et al. 2012, 412). In 
this way, the LTTE’s status as a 
secessionist movement is abso-
lutely critical in understanding 
their decision not to engage in 
the same repertoire of violence as 
the Sri Lankan state. As the LTTE 
sought to run an independent 
administration in the northeast 
of the island, a successful seces-
sionist movement would require 
backing from international actors 
and bodies that could grant the 
LTTE and an independent Tamil 
state official recognition. The par-
ticularly inhuman nature of rape 
as a tactic of war therefore caused 
the Sri Lankan state to appear as 
the more brutal aggressors and 
Tamil or LTTE victims of rape to 
appear comparatively innocent, 
helpless, and in need of a safe and 
protected space. Therefore, the 
LTTE was able to present itself 
not only as morally superior, but 
indeed as martyrs for a national-
ist cause in the hopes of rallying 
international support for the 
creation of a Tamil state.
 It was precisely this 
nationalist cause that eliminated 
the need for the LTTE to use war-
time rape in order to create social 
cohesion within their military 
ranks. The religious ideology of 
the LTTE and the shared goal of 
creating an independent Tamil 
state served to create strong 
emotional and ideological con-
nections between members of the 
LTTE. Unlike the LTTE, the Sri 
Lankan state was not engaged in 
an existential battle, but rather a 
battle for control over an oppo-
sitional population. This cause, 
though necessary to the sover-
eign goals of the Sri Lankan state, 
likely did not inspire the same de-
gree of devotion and cohesion as 
the LTTE’s religious nationalism. 
Therefore, the Sri Lankan state 
relied on other methods to create 
critical group cohesion, inspire 
loyalty, and build a military force 
dedicated to a common outcome.
 The widespread use of 
rape by the Sri Lankan security 
forces may be attributed to a 
number of reasons. Primarily, 
rape is often used as a tactic of in-
timidation and repression against 
secessionist movements or politi-
cal opposition during civil and 
ethnic conflict. Moreover, rape 
is a convenient (albeit atrocious) 
method of dehumanization, in 
which the aggressors are able to 
view the victims as less-than-
human in order to excuse the use 
of rape as a method of genocide, 
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ethnic cleansing, and brutal sup-
pression (see Wood, Bergsmo, 
Kirk, Grey & Shepherd, and Zur-
briggen). This dehumanization of 
victims allows to perpetrators to 
limit self-inflicted psychological 
damage and upholds the argu-
ment that rape is inevitable in 
war, especially ethnic conflicts in 
which both sides view the other 
as inhuman. However, this re-
search posits that the Sri Lankan 
state also used rape as a means of 
social bonding in order to foster 
group cohesion through the pun-
ishment of oppositional actors – 
in this case, the LTTE. Literature 
compiled in the aftermath of the 
Sri Lankan civil war (2009-pre-
sent) upholds this argument and 
discusses the critical use of gang 
rape as a bonding exercise for ac-
tors in civil conflict.
 Much of the literature 
points to the use of socialization 
tactics in military training to the 
widespread use of gang rape by 
Sri Lankan security forces during 
the civil war. During the conflict, 
“state security personnel were 
responsible for numerous acts of 
sexual violence against women, 
men, and children in official and 
secret detention centers seeking 
to coerce confessions, degrade 
them, and discourage broader Ta-
mil involvement with the LTTE” 
(Human Rights Watch 2013, 1). 
These practices continue today 
in detention centers throughout 
Sri Lanka, and often involve gang 
rape as a systematic method 
of coercion, intimidation, and 
punishment. Such tactics indicate 
a pattern within the Sri Lankan 
military forces such that “train-
ing and socialization…take place 
both formally through group 
institutions such as boot camp 
and informally through initiation 
rituals and hazing” (Bergsmo 
et al. 2012, 405). These hazing 
tactics often cause enhanced ag-
gression within recruits, mentally 
preparing them for engagement 
in tactics such as gang rape.
 The effects of hazing 
rituals are especially salient when 
recruitment is forced or com-
mitted via abduction of new 
recruits. The Sri Lankan security 
forces were accused of abduct-
ing children as young as twelve 
years old and requiring them to 
fight against the LTTE in sepa-
ratist movements (Foster 2006). 
Existing research on pressgang-
ing and occurrences of gang rape 
“argues that gang rape reinforces 
cohesion in groups that rely on 
forced recruitment and thus have 
to create cohesion among hostile 
and bewildered recruits” and 
to enhance aggression among 
combatants (Bergsmo et al. 2012, 
415). Engaging in behavior such 
as gang rape breaks social expec-
tation, creates bonds of loyalty 
between frightened and aggres-
sive recruits, and is often viewed 
as a necessary aspect of combat-
ant socialization. This is one of 
the main reasons why gang rape 
occurs much more commonly in 
wartime settings (Cohen 2013).
 The widespread use of 
gang rape by the Sri Lankan 
security forces indicates that such 
behavior was used not only as a 
punitive measure (which may be 
achieved by rape committed by 
a single aggressor), but also as 
a means of creating social unity 
among troops. In a submission 
to the UN Convention Against 
Torture, a UK Charity called 
Freedom from Torture examined 
35 cases of post-war torture by 
the Sri Lankan security appa-
ratus, and found that “Sixty per 
cent of their sample had suffered 
sexual violence (including rape, 
sexual assault and violence to 
sexual organs) but many survi-
vors suffered ‘intense shame’ and 
gave accounts with ‘immense 
difficulty’” (Sooka 2014, 80-81). 
Though this is a relatively small 
sample, the high percentage of 
respondents that admitted to 
being victims of sexual violence 
despite the pervasive culture of 
shame surrounding victimhood 
may indicate an even higher 
proportion of rape victims who 
were held as political detainees. 
Conversely, the ideological bonds 
of the LTTE and attempt to create 
a “good-guy” image reduced the 
effect of forced recruitment on 
occurrences of rape. Instead, the 
LTTE used violent tactics such as 
suicide bombing, displacement 
and razing of villages, sparrowing 
(hit and run), and ethnic cleans-
ing. Rather than demonstrating 
mercy, experts on Tamil culture 
and the LTTE have asserted 
that, “They don’t wait around 
to indulge in sexuality, they just 
shoot you down,” indicating a 
divergence in violent tactics used 
throughout the war (Wood 2009, 
148).
CASE STUDY B — EL SALVADOR
In order to effectively examine 
the use of rape within the Sal-
vadoran civil war, it is necessary 
that one understand the political 
background in El Salvador and 
the positions of the oppositional 
parties involved in the state con-
flict from 1980-1992. 
 This war was a conflict 
between the military government 
of El Salvador and the Farabundo 
Martí National Liberation Front 
(FMLN). The FMLN was a coali-
tion of leftist guerrilla organiza-
tions that aimed to overthrow the 
military government and create 
a communist government in its 
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place (Wood 2012). However, 
as in Sri Lanka, the case of El 
Salvador demonstrates a peculiar 
asymmetry in the use of rape as 
a tactic of war. While the FMLN 
cadres did not employ rape, “gov-
ernment soldiers and security 
forces engaged in sexual violence, 
including gang and multiple 
rapes, against many suspected 
insurgent supporters (including 
men) held in both official and 
secret detention sites. Govern-
ment forces also carried out mass 
rape” illustrating another deep 
divide in tactics used by either 
side of the conflict (Wood 2009, 
152). Again, this disjuncture 
raises the vital question of why 
wartime rape is asymmetrical and 
what sociopolitical variables may 
influence armed actors’ willing-
ness to engage in wartime sexual 
violence.
 For the purpose of clar-
ity, the below table provides an 
outline of each side of the con-
flict.
 As in the Sri Lankan 
case, this research will explore the 
hypothesis that armed groups
with a higher need to recruit 
members are less likely to com-
mit wartime rape in order to 
maintain moral legitimacy (aka 
the “good guy” image), which 
may account for the asym-
metrical use of rape between 
state and non-state actors. This 
hypothesis was proven true in 
the Salvadoran case, especially 
given the tendency of the FMLN 
to recruit female cadres and the 
FMLN rhetoric that conscrip-
tion for women was actually a 
tactic of rape prevention. The 
Salvadoran military’s use of rape 
against citizen populations was so 
widespread that, “Women were 
encouraged to join the FMLN to 
protect themselves from rape…
in war-torn El Salvador, young 
girls came to understand the 
FMLN camps as the only loca-
tion where men would respect 
women’s bodies” (Viterna 2013, 
112-113).  This discourse ignited 
the FMLN’s quest for a “good 
guy” image and lent legitimacy to 
their socialist cause. 
 As discussed above, 
recruitment strategy and the 
need to conscript citizens is a key 
rationale for the maintenance of a
“good guy” image on the
 part of non-state actors and the 
tendency to avoid the use of rape 
during wartime. In the case of the 
FMLN, the group “did not rape 
because not raping was a critical 
aspect of their recruitment strat-
egy. As such, it became a central 
part of the FMLN’s collective 
identity as ‘the good guys’,” and 
established a sense of deep loyalty 
between the FMLN leadership 
and its female cadres, who felt 
that they owed the FMLN their 
bodily safety” (Viterna 2013, 
116). Of course, the anti-regime 
rape narrative was not the only 
reason that the FMLN refused to 
use rape as a tactic of war. Their 
reliance on female cadre also cre-
ated a more gender-equitable cul-
ture within the FMLN. Women 
became so involved that they, 
“comprised nearly one-third of 
the approximately 13,000 guerril-
las and an estimated 80 percent of 
their civilian supporters….They 
accepted the socialist logic that 
class, not gender, was the central 
problem, and that women’s equal-
ity would come naturally with a 
socialist revolution” (Viterna & 
Fallon 2008, 680). The employ-
ment of rape tactics by the FMLN 
would risk alienating a third of 
their armed force and delegiti-
mizing their socialist objectives. 
The highly ideological identity 
of the FMLN, requiring civilian 
cooperation and gender equal 
status between cadres, eliminated 
the ability of FMLN soldiers to 
engage in rape as a tactic of war 
whilst simultaneously construct-
ing a “good guy” narrative that 
was so effective it led to the 
transformation of the FMLN into 
a political party within the post-
transition democracy.
 Unlike in Sri Lanka, the 
use of rape by the Salvadoran 
military was widespread but 
poorly documented, as much 
of it took place primarily in 
clandestine detention facilities 
(Wood 2009). However, some 
highly publicized rapes by the 
Salvadoran state occurred in the 
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Actor
Government 
Soldier and Secu-
rity Forces of E1
El Salvador
Farabundo Marti 
National
Liberation Front 
(FMLN)
Use of Rape
Widespread, 
systemic, and stra-
tegic – rape used as 
punitive measure to 
deter FMLN involv-
ment
Very restricted use 
of rape.
Goals
Continuation of the 
military authori-
tarian regime and 
repression of leftist 
insurgent groups 
(FMLN)
Overthrow of the 
military authori-
tarian regime and 
creation of a partici-
patory communist 
government in El 
Salvador
Outcome
Signing of the 
Chapultepec Ac-
cords and transi-
tion to democracy. 
Violence in decade 
following accords.
FMLN transformed 
into center-left po-
litical party and now 
holds a plurality of 
seats in the National 
Assembly
Alvarez (2010); Bergsmo (2012); Viterna (2013); Wood (2010); Human Rights Watch (2013); The Bar 
Human Rights Committee of England and Wales (2013); 
early 1980s and demonstrated 
a close parallel to the gang rape 
tendencies of the Sri Lankan 
security forces. In March of 1981, 
“soldiers and members of the 
Cacaopera civil defense unit at-
tacked the population, consisting 
solely of women, young children, 
and old people. They killed the 
inhabitants and raped a number 
of women and little girls under 
the age of 12” (Bentacur 2001, 
59). This attack demonstrates 
the brutality used by soldiers for 
the regime and the tendency to 
perpetrate rape in the company 
of their fellow soldiers. Also in 
1981, an elite battalion trained 
and equipped by the United 
States took part in a violent oper-
ation that killed over a thousand 
citizens in an “orgy” of murder 
and rape that was well-publicized 
due to US complicity (Chomsky 
2002). These events demonstrate 
the tendency of the Salvadoran 
armed forces during the regime 
to engage in rape on a mass scale 
in addition to rape in detention 
facilities as punishment for those 
engaging in FMLN efforts.
 Like the Sri Lankan 
security forces, the Salvadoran 
military government relied on 
the forced recruitment of youth, 
especially young boys, to act as 
informants and soldiers against 
the insurgency (Manuel 1987). 
This forced conscription, as in Sri 
Lanka, created an armed force 
that lacked unity and required 
methods of bonding to ensure 
social cohesion within the ranks. 
Though there was limited public-
ity surrounding the use of rape 
by Salvadoran forces during the 
civil war, testimonies collected 
by Tutela Legal, a human rights 
office led by the Roman Catholic 
Church in El Salvador, reveal 
some critical findings surround-
ing the use of sexual violence. 
The types of sexual violence 
found in their report were as fol-
lows, “sexual humiliation (41 per-
cent), rape and gang rape (24 per-
cent), sexual torture (18 percent), 
attempted and threatened acts of 
sexual violence (12 percent) and 
sexual mutilation (4 percent)” 
(Leiby 2012, 13). Of the women 
targeted, 53% experienced rape 
and gang rape. The high propor-
tion of gang rapes may indicate 
a parallel finding to that in Sri 
Lanka – forced conscription leads 
to higher rates of gang rape and 
sexual violence.
 Dara Kay Cohen creates 
a theoretical framework in her 
research that differentiates the 
levels of sexual violence used by 
armed forces. Level 1 indicates 
low levels of rape, level 2 moder-
ate use of rape tolerated by upper 
command, and level 3 widespread 
and state-sanctioned use of rape. 
According to Cohen, “State forces 
that rely on pressganging [forci-
ble enlisting] are about 1.6 times, 
2.5 times, and 4 times more likely 
to commit wartime rape at levels 
1, 2, and 3 respectively, than 
those government actors that 
do not pressgang” (Cohen 2012, 
473). This correlates closely to the 
behavior of both the Sri Lankan 
and Salvadoran state security 
forces, which widely used gang 
rape and pressganging as a form 
of social cohesion and soldier 
conscription. In order to embody 
the role of soldiers in patriarchal 
societies, “boys must become 
warriors. The result is that com-
batants represent domination of 
the enemy in highly gendered 
terms and use specifically sexual 
violence against enemy popula-
tions,” as occurred in both Sri 
Lanka and El Salvador (Bergsmo 
et al. 2012, 402). The Salvadoran 
case is particularly relevant, as 
the authoritarian nature of the 
military regime created a reign 
of terror designed to instrumen-
talize rape and sexual violence 
as a method of citizen control. 
Therefore, the bonding methods 
utilized by soldiers in the Salva-
doran armed forces also relied 
on this gendered violence to 
imbue soldiers with the confi-
dence that they were the strong 
(read: masculine) party and their 
victims the weak (read: femi-
nine). It is unclear whether these 
roles would have been so readily 
adopted by conscripted soldiers 
if not for a preexisting patriar-
chal and hierarchically gendered 
social order in both nations.
CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS
Unfortunately, the scope of this 
paper is greatly limited due to 
the small number of case studies 
examined (2) and limited reliable 
data on perpetration of wartime 
rape. However, a recent report by 
the Peace Research Institute Oslo 
(PRIO) states that,
Of all 48 conflicts in Africa be-
tween 1989 and 2009 – including 
both civil conflicts and interstate 
state wars – and all 236 active, 
organized armed groups— in-
cluding armed state organiza-
tions, rebel groups, and progov-
ernment militias— 64 percent of 
armed groups were not reported 
to have engaged in any form of 
sexual violence.
             (Cohen et al 2013)
This new report lends greater le-
gitimacy to the argument against 
wartime rape inevitability and 
reinforces the current struggle 
to hold perpetrators of wartime 
rape accountable in international 
criminal courts.
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 Additionally, some 
reports on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict claim that both sides 
have limited the use of sexual 
violence, while others insist that 
the violence is primarily per-
petrated by Israeli authorities 
while Palestinian prisoners are in 
detention (Sjoberg & Via 2010; 
International Middle East Media 
Center 2014). Though there is 
very limited data in this case, 
Israel/Palestine could provide a 
useful study as scholars continue 
to examine the repertoires of vio-
lence employed by both sides of 
the conflict and more data on the 
conflict becomes available. Israel/
Palestine may prove a unique 
case, and scholars have already 
begun incorporating it into war-
time rape literature, writing that 
“sexual violence…is dispropor-
tionately low in Israel/Palestine 
and sharply asymmetric in El 
Salvador and Sri Lanka” (Sjoberg 
& Via 2010, 131). In the case of 
Israel/Palestine and the ongoing 
struggle of each group for self- 
determination, it is possible that 
both sides of the conflict have 
much to gain from the “good 
guy” image and entirely too 
much to lose if it is discovered by 
international human rights agen-
cies or the United Nations that 
they are perpetrating wartime 
rape. In order to strengthen the 
claims made in this paper, Israel/
Palestine will provide a valuable 
area for further research.
CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Through this research, both Hy-
pothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 have 
been proven in the cases
of Sri Lanka and El Salvador. 
The assumption that non-state 
actors would need to eschew the 
use of wartime rape in order to 
construct a “good guy” image and 
therefore ensure citizen
cooperation was indicated in 
both Sri Lanka and El Salvador 
by the moralistic narratives
constructed by the LTTE and 
FMLN. The LTTE effort to, 
“establish a new homeland 
undergirded by a strict moral-
sexual imperative” eliminated 
their capacity to use rape as a 
tactic of war, as to do so would 
delegitimize their political and 
social goals and invite interna-
tional rejection of the creation 
of an independent Tamil state 
(Tambiah 2005, 259). Addition-
ally, the FMLN narrative of rape-
prevention as perpetrated by the 
Salvadoran military regime cre-
ated a space for female guerillas 
and compelled women to become 
involved in the socialist move-
ment in El Salvador (Viterna 
2013). This tactic was so success-
ful that the FMLN was able to 
transition into a political party 
after democratization and is now 
one of the most influential parties 
in El Salvador.
 Moreover, Hypothesis 2 
was upheld through an examina-
tion of the relationship between 
forced recruitment in state forces 
and the subsequent widespread 
use of gang rape as a practice 
to ensure group cohesion. Both 
the Sri Lankan security appara-
tus and the Salvadoran military 
regime utilized pressganging and 
conscripted soldiers as young as 
12 and 13 years old respectively. 
This method of conscription cre-
ated the necessity for the forma-
tion of social cohesion, a goal 
which was achieved through the 
dehumanization of the opposi-
tion and socialization via sexual 
violence. The brutality of these 
tactics allowed the state forces to 
break their social contract with 
citizens and engage in mass rape 
and sexual violence against citi-
zens they deemed as inhuman or 
deserving of punishment, degra-
dation, and humiliation (Cohen
2013).
 Another critical aspect 
of these cases that was not fully 
explicated in this research but 
has a great effect on the use of 
rape as a war tactic in these two 
cases is judicial impunity (or lack 
of impunity) for rape as a war 
crime. In the case of the LTTE, 
“after four cadre gang-raped a 
13- year-old girl, ‘as punishment 
their hands were bound and they 
were dragged behind a tractor. At 
the end their bodies were torn up, 
and they were crying for water 
when they died” (Wood 2009, 
147). Punishment for rape in the 
LTTE was swift, severe, and often 
resulted in death. As such, the 
LTTE was able to limit the use of 
rape by cadres, due to a culture of 
strict discipline and a lack of im-
punity. Conversely, the Sri Lan-
kan military forces did not face 
any punishment for their use of 
rape as a weapon of war. Though 
there is a large quantity of evi-
dence documenting the human 
rights abuses, particularly crimes 
against humanity such as rape 
and sexual torture, committed 
by the Sri Lankan security forces, 
they “are able to commit these 
violations with impunity in the 
full confidence that they are not 
likely to be held accountable….
This has created an environment 
of impunity which is clearly 
sanctioned at the highest levels of 
government” (Sooka 2014, 49).  
This impunity imbalance is a key 
reason for the absence of rape 
perpetration by the LTTE and 
high levels of perpetration by the 
Sri Lankan state forces.
 Similarly, the FMLN 
55
RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE: Katherine Bogen
Po
lit
ic
al
 S
ci
en
ce
condemned the use of rape as 
a tactic of war and included in 
their policies that, “anyone found 
to have raped a woman faced 
the death penalty” (Vásquez 
1997, 143). Although this policy 
was not enforced with the same 
harshness as that of the LTTE, 
the FMLN had other social and 
cultural incentives to refuse to 
engage in rape – namely, the 
critical involvement of women in 
the socialist movement. Not only 
were there a high proportion of 
women in the FMLN, but “most 
participants in their rebel army 
mobilized around ideologies of 
human rights and social justice,” 
a fact which eliminated the use 
of rape as a tactic of war from the 
FMLN’s repertoire of violence 
(Viterna & Fallon 2008, 679). It 
is therefore unclear whether the 
FMLN did or did not have an 
effective punitive culture against 
the use of rape as a war tactic, 
given that there were so many 
alternate incentives not to engage 
in rape.
 Unlike the FMLN, the 
Salvadoran state military appara-
tus engaged in mass rape and sex-
ual violence both publicly during 
the civil war and in clandestine 
detention facilities in the later 
years of the conflict. However, 
the widespread culture of silence 
surrounding sexual violence in El 
Salvador has constructed a cul-
ture of impunity. The continued 
high level of violence in El Sal-
vador in the post-transition era 
demonstrates that “there is the 
issue of feeling impotent against 
the enormity of violence. This…
points to a larger structure of im-
punity that still characterizes the 
Salvadoran state” as well as a per-
ception that violence is inevitable 
(Hume 2008, 72). The inability of 
the Salvadoran state to indict per-
petrators of these violent human 
rights abuses and crimes against 
humanity during the civil war is a 
major reason that rape and sexual 
violence were so widespread dur-
ing the conflict. Unfortunately, 
the culture of impunity has not 
changed in the new democracy, 
indicating a failure on the part of 
international law to be effectively 
enforced in Sri Lanka.
 The recent efforts of 
international communities 
to recognize and stop overall 
gender- based violence (for 
example, HeForShe, the US 
State Department Gender Based 
Violence Emergency Response 
and Protection Initiative, and the 
UN Campaign to End Violence 
Against Women) provide a valu-
able backdrop for movements to 
prosecute violence perpetrators, 
including perpetrators of wartime 
sexual violence. As these move-
ments gain traction and success 
in the international community, 
the resultant strengthening of 
cultural norms that reject sexual 
and gender-based violence will 
help create legal accountability 
for perpetrators while reducing 
the likelihood that armed groups 
will choose to engage in strategic 
rape. Some policy recommenda-
tions are as follows: first, the UN 
and other international govern-
ing bodies such as the Inter-
national Criminal Court must 
name and shame state actors that 
perpetuate rape as a weapon of 
war. This tactic would include 
holding specific commanders 
responsible for the behavior of 
their troops rather than trying 
to indict an entire armed force. 
Such legislative and social ac-
tion could create an incentive 
for commanders to reduce their 
inferiors’ engagement in rape and 
sexual violence. Moreover, these 
name and shame campaigns may 
cause other nations to withdraw 
funding for these forces and will 
help to foster the aforementioned 
culture of accountability. Second, 
NGOs and organizations help-
ing previous victims of wartime 
rape must seek reparations for 
victims and dismantle structures 
of impunity by calling national 
and international judiciaries to 
action. Indictment and prosecu-
tion of commanders responsible 
for these atrocities, even decades 
overdue, will demonstrate to 
other potential perpetrators that 
such behavior will not be toler-
ated by the international commu-
nity and that to engage in such 
human rights abuses will corrode 
that nations’ moral legitimacy 
and can be effectively punished. 
Third, armed groups that engage 
in pressganging should be very 
closely monitored by the inter-
national community to ensure 
that their efforts to create social 
cohesion do not include gang 
rape and sexual violence, as these 
tactics are widespread and often 
sparked by social disunity within 
armed forces. In line with this 
examination, state forces must re-
vise their socialization and train-
ing procedures to avoid hyper-
masculinist, aggressive training 
regimens that create misogynistic 
behavioral norms – for example, 
training measures that refer to 
new recruits as “fags” or “pussies” 
in order to get them to toughen 
up (Bergsmo et al. 2012).
 Finally, education and 
intervention campaigns must 
demonstrate that women are 
not the sole victims of rape as a 
tactic of war. Men and boys are 
often also targeted, with estimates 
of up to 76% of male political 
prisoners in El Salvador dur-
ing the 1980s reporting at least 
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one incidence of sexual torture 
during their detainment (Storr 
2011). This contradicts the widely 
accepted international narrative 
of rape and sexual violence that 
places men solely in the position 
of perpetrator and women in 
the position of victim. To create 
a discourse on rape and sexual 
violence that includes narratives 
of male victimhood may help to 
affect social and political pro-
gress on these issues. Society at 
large has been inundated with 
images and stories of women in 
the position of victim and men 
in the position of perpetrator. 
Building on the current efforts 
of humanitarian aid organiza-
tions to address female victims of 
wartime sexual violence, such or-
ganizations should also reach out 
to male victims and establish a 
narrative that addresses wartime 
rape as motivated not by sex, but 
by a strategic effort to gain power.
 The inclusion of male 
victims into the current wartime 
rape narrative may be especially 
effective due to our global mascu-
linity culture, which erases male 
victimhood. Current assumptions 
surrounding rape and sexual 
violence in the context of war 
view rape as both opportunistic 
and strategic attempts by male 
soldiers to control oppositional 
populations through the punish-
ment of “their” women, physical 
intimidation, or literal biological 
elimination. Literature that ex-
plores use of rape as a genocidal 
weapon (for example, impregnat-
ing women in order to eliminate 
an opposing religious group or 
indigenous population), though 
critical in exploring the goals and 
aims of wartime rape, essentially 
disregards narratives of male 
victimhood and silences a sur-
vivor population that should be 
designated equal rights to female 
victims. Future efforts to reduce 
instances of rape in the context 
of war must examine the reali-
ties of male victims and establish 
trauma-informed interventions 
that are wholly inclusive.
 In summary, this paper 
has demonstrated that rape, 
though widespread, is not inevi-
table during war. The “timeless 
ubiquity” argument has been 
weakened, and the goal to hold 
perpetrators of this egregious war 
crime has been established. The 
LTTE and the FMLN were able 
to effectively prohibit combatants 
from raping civilians through 
creating a punitive culture and 
relying on a “good guy” image. 
This ability establishes a prec-
edent that armed militant groups 
may refrain from the use of 
rape during violent conflict and 
demonstrates a need for further 
research. Scholars, legislators, 
human rights organizations, and 
international governing bodies 
should seek to understand the 
cases in which wartime sexual 
violence has been successfully 
deterred. Additionally, these 
stakeholders must seek to address 
the conditions that make wide-
spread wartime rape a seeming 
inevitability, including high rates 
of gender-based violence perpe-
tration during peacetime, legal 
impunity for sexual violence 
perpetrators during peacetime 
and war, forced conscription of 
soldiers, erasure of male victim-
hood from the current rape nar-
rative, and widespread cultural 
stigma against victims of sexual 
violence. Doing so has the po-
tential of greatly limiting or even 
eliminating the use of rape dur-
ing wartime, reducing instances 
of intergenerational trauma and 
ensuing psychopathological ef-
fects, inspiring international col-
laboration, and creating a more 
gender-equal social order.
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